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Introduction 
NOTES ON A POST-DERRIDEAN APPLIED 
LINGUISTICS 
Robin Melrose 
The French philosopher Jacques Derrida has exercised 
an enourmous influence on French thought over the last 
twenty years, particularly with his technique of 
deconstruction, and more recently the influence has spread 
to English-speaking countries, in fields as diverse as literary 
theory, the study of popular culture, feminist theory, and 
the study of performance. One discipline that remains largely 
untouched by this Derridean 'wave' is linguistics; this is 
hardly surprising, since linguists (for the most part) believe 
in hard-edged categories, while Derrida's deconstructive 
technique is precisely an exploding of categories. 
Linguists may have ignored Derrida, but he has not 
ignored them. In 'Linguistics and Grammatology1l and 
'Semiology and Grammatology1,2 he examined the funda-
mentals of Saussurean linguistics; and in 'Signature, Event, 
Context13 and 'Limited Inc abc ••• 14 he undertook a similar 
survey of speech act theory. These four works constitute 
a valuable critique of idealising Iangue/parole, competence/ 
performance linguistics and point the way forward to a post-
Derridean 'linguistics of indeterminacy'. 
But before we examine these works, I should explain 
what deconstruction is. One of Derrida's best known state-
ments is that 'Speech is writing', and Schleiffer5 shows that 
Derrida, by making this claim, has overturned a hierarchy: 
in the pair 'say/write', 'say' is the unmarked term ('Derrida 
says ••• ' may refer to a verbal or written· pronouncement); 
but Derrida has in effect installed 'write' as the unmarked 
term (what Schleiffer calls the 'deconstructive term') in 
such a way that it 'resists and disorganizes the hierarchy'. 
Derrida's claim that 'speech is writing' is, of course, 
fundamental to his deconstruction of Saussurean linguistics 
and speech act theory. At its crudest, the claim simply 
means that, since the concept of sign only became tpinkable 
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with the advent of phonetic writing6, then all instituted 
signifiers, whether gr~hic (in the classical sense) or phonic, 
are "written" signifiers. The notion of signifiers as graphemic 
inf or ms three 'quasi-c;:oncepts' that Derrida deploys in his 
critique of Saussure and Austin/Searle: differ~ce, spacing 
and iterability. 
Difference 
The term diff erance is a neologism coined by Derrida 
and presumably based on the present participle diff erant 
(from differer), which in French means 'differing' and 
'deferring'. It relates, of course, to Saussure's principle 
of difference: 
Concepts are purely differential and defined 
not by their positive content but negatively 
by their relations with the other t'erms 
of the systems. Their most precise 
characteristics is in being what the others 
are not.8 
In linguistics, the principle of difference is usually thought 
of in terms of binary opposites (e.g. voiced/voiceless; + 
MALE/-MALE), or in terms of paradigms (e.g. all the 
grammatical items that can fill the determiner slot). But 
Derrida conceives of difference in a rather more complex 
way: 
[ .•• ] the phonic element, the term, the 
plenitude that is called sensible, would 
not appear as such without the difference 
or opposition which gives them form [ ... ] 
Here the appearing and functioning of 
difference presupposes an originary 
synthesis not preceded . by any absolute 
simplicity. Such would be the originary 
trace. Without a retention in the minimal 
unit of temporal experience, without 
a trace retaining the other as other in 
the same, no difference would do its work 
and no meaning would appear. It is not 
the question of a constituted difference 
here, but rather, before all determination 
of the content, of the pure movement 
which produces difference. The (pure) 
trace is diff eranee [ ... ] 
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Diff erance is therefore the formation 
of form.9 
Derrida then goes on to say that differance is also the 'being 
imprinted of the imprint', which is to say (following Saussure) 
that the sound image (i.e. phoneme) is 'the structure of the 
appearing of the sound', not the 'sound appearing' - it is 
'what is heard, not the somd heard but the being-heard of 
the sound1.lO 
As I understand it, Derrida is making two very important 
points here. The first point is that every time we make 
a linguistic choice - say, in meaning - this choice carries 
within it the trace of meanings not chosen. And the second 
point is that every time we hear a sound or apprehend a 
meaning, what we are hearing and apprehending carries 
within it the trace of the not - heard, the not - apprehended 
(what Hjelmslev calls 'content purport')~ It is because of 
this trace that meaning is not identical to itself and is always 
deferred. 
What are the implications of diff erance for contemporary 
linguistics? The answer to this question is to be found in 
an interview with Julia Kristeva: 
Difference is the systematic play of 
differences [ ••• ] The activity or productivity 
connoted by the a of difference refers 
to the generative movement in the play 
of differences. The latter are neither 
fallen f:rom the sky nor inscribed once 
and for all in a closed system, a static 
structure that a synchronic and taxonomic 
operation could exhaust. Differences 
are the effects of transformations, and 
from this vantage the theme of difference 
is incompatible with the static, synchronic, 
taxonomic, ahistoric motifs in the concept 
of structure.11 
The answer is clear. Difference is incompatible - and these 
are only examples - with Jakobson's linguistic analysis of 
poetry and his distinctive feature phonology; with immediate 
constituent analysis; with transformational-generative 
grammar; with truth-conditional semantics; and with Searle's 
version of speech act theory. For each of these projects 
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version of speech act theory. For, each of these projects 
is seeking to erect a 'closed system that a synchronic and 
taxonomic operation could exhaust'. 
Spacing 
The langue/parole dichotomy (and its Chomskyan 
counterpart competence/performance) is, of course, 
fundamental to modern linguistics. This dichotomy, as 
Saussure12 makes clear, is based on the unconscious 
dichotomy: langue is 'passively assimilated' and 'never requires 
premeditation', while parole is 'wilful and intellectual'. 
But if 'speech is writing', then the unconscious/conscious 
dualism is negated by the spacing that is writing's most 
distinctive feature. Derrida's argument is woven around 
two Saussurean terms, 'passivity' and 'difference': 
The relationship between passivity and 
difference cannot be distinguished from 
the relationship between the fundamental 
1Blconsciousness of language and the spacing 
(pause, blank, punctuation, interval in 
general, etc.) which constitutes the origin 
of signification.13 
And what is the relationship between the unconsciousness 
of language and spacing? The answer is: 
Spacing as writing is the becoming-absent 
and the becoming - unconscious of the 
subject [ ••• ]: the unconscious is nothing 
without this cadence and before the 
caesura.14 
Derrida, in other words, is questioning the concept of 
conscious speaking subject which underlies the langue/parole 
and competence/performance dichotomies.15 This is made 
clear elsewhere, in 'Semiology and Grammatology': 
spacing is temporization, the detour and 
postponement by means of which intuition, 
perception, consummation - in a word, 
the relationship to the present, the 
reference to a present reality, to a being 
- are always deferred. Deferred by virtue 
of the very principle of difference which 
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holds that an element functions or signifies 
[ ••• ] only by ref erring to another past 
or future element.16 
The conscious speaking subject, then, is not so much a 
presence as a constant becoming, for, says Derrida: 
the subject, and first of all the conscious 
and speaking subject, depends upon the 
system of differences, and the movement 
of difference [ ••• ] is constituted only in 
bei~g divided from itself, in becoming 
space, in temporizing, in def erral.17 
Derrida, thus, rejects the distinction unconscious/conscious, 
pref erring to see the conscious speaking subject as constituted 
only by an endless cycle of becoming unconscious/becoming 
conscious - a cycle in which, by virtue of the principle. of 
difference and the trace of the choices not rnade, any 
reference to a present reality is deferred and meaning is 
held in reserve. If ·we accept the validity of this argument, 
then the implication is clear: the langue/paroJ,e and 
competence/performance dichotomies, founded as they 
are on the unconscious/ conscious, are totally without 
f olllldation. 
Iterability 
Closely related to diff erance and spacing, and to the 
claim that all signifiers are "written" signifiers, is the 'quasi-
concept' of iterability, as put forward in Derrida's essay 
on speech acts: 
[any element] of the signifying form is 
constituted only qy its iterability, by 
the possibility of being repeated in the 
absence not only of its referent [ ••• ], but 
of a determined signified or current 
intention of signification, as of every 
present intention of communication. 
This structural possibility of being severed 
from its referent or signified (and therefore 
from communication and its context) 
seems to me to make of every mark, even 
if oral, a grapheme in general, that is 
[ ••• ] the non-present remainingl 8 of a 
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differential mark cut off from its alleged 
"production" or origin.19 
Iterability is the key to Derrida's deconstruction of speech 
acts. For Austin20 iterability is the marked term: he regards 
speech acts as 'hollow or void if said by an actor on the 
stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in a soliloquy'. 
But for Derrida, iterability is the unmarked 'deconstructive' 
term: 
is not what Austin excludes as anomalous, 
exceptional, "non-serious", that is citation 
(on the stage, in a poem, or in a soliloquy), 
the determined modification of a general 
citationality or rather, a general 
iterability without which there would 
not even be a "successful" performative?21 
That is, as Derrida subsequently says, a speech act could 
not succeed unless it were 'identifiable as conforming to 
an iterable model1.22 
A basic tenet of speech act theory is that certain speech 
acts are felicitous only if the speaker intends to carry out 
the act to which he/she has committed him/herself. But 
iterability and speaker intention, says Derrida, are not 
compatible: 
intention or attention, directed towards 
something iterable which in turn determines 
it as being iterable, will strive or tend 
in vain to actualize or fulfill itself, for 
it cannot, by virtue of its very structure, 
ever achieve this goal. In no case will 
it be fulfilled, actualized totally present 
to its object and to itself. It is divided 
and deported in advance by its iterability.23 
The relationship between iterability and intention is illustrated 
in an image of great interest to applied linguists: 
the intention which animates utterance 
will never be completely present in itself 
and in its content. The iteration which 




The term dehiscence, which is borrowed from botany, means 
"the bursting open of capsules, fruits, etc in order to discharge 
their mature contents". Derrida glosses it thus: 
Dehiscence (like iterability) limits what 
it makes possible, while rendering its 
rigor and purity impossible. What is at 
work here is something like a law of 
undecidable contamination.25 
Finally, speech act theory - in the original Austinian version 
at least - frequently appeals to context as a means of 
disambiguating performative utterances. But, says Derrida, 
context can never be 'exhaustively determinable': 
For a context to be exhaustively 
determinable [ ••• ] it at least would be 
necessary for the conscious intention 
to be totally present and actually 
transparent for itself and others.26 
And that, of course, is not the case. 
Applied Linguistics After Derrida 
What might be the characteristics of an applied linguistics 
after Derrida? (Notice that I stress applied: I am avoiding 
the question of whether there can be a postDerridean 'pure', 
norrepplied linguistics.) I suggest a preliminary list of the 
three characteristics fundamental to a postDerridean applied 
linguistics: 
1. a formal recognition of difference/difference; 
2. a mechanism for "formalising" dehiscence; and 
3. an orientation not toward product (which is conscious 
and intentional), but toward process (which is a 
becoming). 
Obviously, such an applied linguistics does not at present 
exist. Yet we are not obliged to create it out of nothing, 
for the material is already at hand. Systemic - functional 
grammar, developed over the past 25 years by the British 
linguist M.A.K. Halliday and his associates, has, at least 
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in embryonic form, the three basic characteristics already 
mentioned. 
It is not within the scope of this paper to do anything 
other than give a broad outline of systemic-functional 
gramma~ and interested readers are invited to consult 
Halliday 7 and Kress28 for more. detailed treatment. But 
it is important to understand the meaning of system and 
ftmction, for they are at the heart of what is 'Derridean' 
in Halliday's project. Firstly, a system is a set of choices 
in meaning: for example, a message can be encoded as a 
clause of 'dQing', 'thinking', 'being' or 'saying' (the transitivity 
system); or as a statement, question, command or off er 
(the mood system). Secondly; function refers to the three 
main kinds of meaning, the metafunctfons: experiential 
(the use of language to understand the environment) 
interpersonal (the use of language to act on others), and 
textual (the use of language to organise the messa,ge). 
It is now possible to show that systemic - functional 
grammar carries witnin it at least the trace of differance. 
This passage certainly recalls Derrida's meditation on the 
sound-in1agf; as the 'being-heard of the sound': 
adult use of language is such that [ ... ] 
each utterance has to be multifunctional 
- while at the same time having an 
integrated structure. There must therefore 
be a level of organization of meaning 
[ ••• ] In Hjelmslevian terms, the 'content 
purport' has to be separated from, and 
organized into, a 'content substance' as 
a precondition of its encoding in 'content 
form'. 
What we a,re calling the. functions of 
language may be regarded as the generalized 
categories of 'content substance.' that 
the adult use of language requires.29 
In Derridean terms, Halliday is saying that the 'content-
image' is the 'being-apprehended of the content'. And this 
process is constantly occurring: 
spoJcen language responds continually 
to the small but subtle changes in its 
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environment, both verbal and non-verbal, 
and in so doing exhibits a rich pattern 
of semantic [ ••• ] variation [ ••• ] The content 
of spoken language is in a constant state 
of flux, and the language has to be equally 
mobile and alert. 30 
Thus, implies Halliday, 'content' does not become apprehended 
once and for all, but is in a constant state of becoming 
apprehended. 
But this is only one aspect of differance - the other, 
perhaps more significant, aspect is embodied in the 'fruitful' 
term dehiscence, the law of undecidable contamination. 
There are two terms in systemic-functional grammar which 
together carry some of the force of dehiscence. The first 
of these is indeterminacy, here explained in terms of physics: 
reality consists of meanings, and the fact 
that meanings are essentially indeterminate 
and unbounded is what gives rise to that 
strand in human thought [ ••• ] in which 
the emphasis is, on the dynamic, .. .r 'lVelike 
aspect of reality [ ••• ] The fact that aspects 
of reality can be digitalized and reduced 
to ordered operations on symbols is still 
consistent with the view of reality as 
meaning: certain aspects of meaning 
are also captured in this way. Pike (1976) 
expressed this property of the linguistic 
system [ ••• ] by viewing language as particle, 
wave and field; each of these perspectives 
reveals a different truth about it.31 
Subsequently, Halliday elaborated on this: the kind of mea..ning 
that is expressed in a particle-like manner is experiential 
meaning (e.g.. the processes, participants and circumstances 
of the transitivity system); the kind of meaning expressed 
as a 'field' - and recall that magnetism and electricity are 
fields - is inter-personal meaning (e.g. attitudes, comments, 
judgements); and the kind of meaning that forms a W"lVe 
- like pattern of peaks and troughs is textual meaning (e.g. 
theme - the point of departure of the message - information 
focus and conjuctions). 3"2 A brief illustration should clarify 
this very important hypothesis. First, particles of meaning: 
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1 He slapped me on the back 
Actor Material Goal Location I 
An 'environmental' phenomenon is described by discrete 
uni.ts. 
Now, the 'field' of meaning ENTHUSIASM: 
2 I was@ 8 by your@ present. 
Here ENTHUSIASM is a 'force field' expressed by the 
submodifier 'so', the choice of 'thrilled', rather than (say) 
'pleased', the attitudinal epithet 'lovely', choice of intonation 
(probably rising-falling on 'thrilled' and 'lovely', and gestural 
features (e.g. smile). 
Finally, 'waves' of meaning: 
3 ~ut unfortunately ir~-w-a_s_n-,t-a'.:-bl'."""e-· _t_Jo~ 
letter. 
The essential elements in the organisation of the message 
('But', 'I', 'type') are, so to speak, the crests of a wave. 
The relationship between indetermina~y and dehiscence 
should at this point be clear. If meanings were only 
particulate, there might well be no mismatch between speaker 
and addressee; but given that meanings are also field - and 
wave-like there is a mismatch, and the law of undecidable 
contamination is born. (Perceptive readers will now see 
why, in speaking of formalising dehiscence, I issued a warning 
in the form of scare-marks: any formalisation of fields 
and waves is necessarily rather fluid). 
The second term with some of the force of dehiscenl!e 
is process. Process is contrasted with product, and is used 
in two slightly different but related ways. The systemic-
functional linguist Martin pairs process with dynamic system, 
and product (which he calls text) with synoptic system: 
an example of a synoptic system is transitivity or mood; 
an example of a dynamic system is Ventola's decision tree 
or flow chart for generating well formed schematic structures 
for services encounters.33 In such a dy11amic system, explains 
Martin,34 a service encounter is 'viewed subje.ctively, in 
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the process of manifestation, full of interacting decisions, 
dependencies, choices and the like'. This view accords with 
Derrida's position on speaker intention and context35 and 
with Halliday's theoretical stance (never, I think, put into 
practice) that context is 'constantly changing, each part 
serving in turn as environment for the next1.36 
Halliday himself uses process and product to make another 
distinction: 
The process/product distinction is a relevant 
one for linguistics because it corresponds 
to that between our experience of speech 
and our experience of writing [ ••• ] A written 
text is presented to us as product [ .•• ] 
Spoken language on the other hand is 
presented to us as process [ •.• ] characterized 
by a continuous flow, without clear 
segments or boundaries.37 
The implications of this are explored in a recent essay, 
'Language and the Order of Nature'. The point of departure 
for this essay is that in the age of quantum theory 'it is 
impossible to talk about quantum ideas in language as it 
was received' because 'natural language - based metalanguages' 
are 'too determinate and too rigid, too unable to accommodate 
complementarities'. 38 
Now complementarity is a key concept in quantum 
theory, deriving from Einstein's original principle of wave-
particle duality, which stated that particles such as electrons 
exhibit wave-like properties. So given that meanings too 
are wave-and-particle-like, natural language-based 
metalanguages should be able to accommodate 
complementarities. Why then can't they? 
The answer, says Halliday, lies in the nature of written 
language. Written language, as he explains it, is characterised 
by nominalisation, in which a clause is transformed into 
a noun or noun phrase; so in written language 'the world 
is a world of things, rather than one of happening; of Qroduct 
rather than process; of being rather than becoming1.39 The 
written mode 'anchors language to a shallower level of 
consciousness'-40"; language is perceived as 'made of 
constituents-sentences-instead of the de~endency patterns-
clause complexes of the spoken mode1.4 Writing changes 
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the semiotic mode of language 'from the dynamic to the 
synoptic: from fl<i>w to stasis, from choreographic to 
crystalline, from syntactic intricacy to lexical density'. 
In short, writing 'deprives language of the power to intuit, 
to make indefinitely many connections in different directions 
at once, to explore (by tolerating them) contradictions, 
to represent experience as fluid and indeterminate'. 42 
The dynamic and 'choreographic' nature of spoken 
language, and its ability to 'make indefinitely many 
connections' and to 'explore contradictions', are surely very 
close to dehiscence. 
Conclusion 
I can now sum up the characteristics of a post-Derridean 
applied linguistics in a. more recognisably 'linguistic' form: 
1. it must be based on the principle of semantic systems 
(i.e. systematic choices in meaning); 
2. it must have a way of accommodating indeterminacy 
(i.e. it must recognise that meanings are not on:ly 
particulate, but also field-and wave-like); 
3. it must be able to 'formalise' the process-like nature 
of interactions; and 
4. it must have a technique for probing the 'process' 
that is masked by the written 'product'. 
But how can such an applied linguistics actually be 
applied? As an applied linguist specialising in English as 
a Second Language, I have two suggestions. The first, is 
that, as part of a communicative language course, students 
be taught meaning-negotiation skills. Here, students are 
presented with interactive situations in which not all 
contextual features are clear, and are sensitised to the 
linguistic, paralinguistic and non-verbal clues and techniques 
which may permit them to interpret and negotiate meaning.43 
The second suggestion concerns reading skills, and is based 
on the hypothesis that 'dense' expository writing may be 
more comprehensible if it is 'unpacked', that is, transformed 
from the 'crystalline' to the 'choreographic'. Here is a simple 
example from Halliday, in which 
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1. 'experimental emphasis becomes concentrated 
in testing the generalizations and consequences 
derived from these theories' 
becomes: 
f. 'we now start experimenting, mainly in order to 
test whether things happen regularly as we would 
expect if we were explaining in the right way1.44 
Such a procedure should enable students to re.,-interpret 
dense expository writing in the more 'natural' spoken mode. 
The study of literature could also learn from this 'new' 
applied linguistics. An emphasis on meaning as choice and 
on the trace of meanings not chosen, on 'fields' and 'waves' 
of meaning, and on text as a process rather than a product 
- in short, on the dehiscence of the signifier - is clearly 
relevant to the interpretation of a literary text. Here, as 
in other areas of the humanities and social sciences, a post-
Derridean applied linguistices has much to offer. 
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